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ABSTRACT: Technological developments in gene editing raise high expectations for clinical applications, including editing of the germline.
The European Society of Human Reproduction and Embryology (ESHRE) and the European Society of Human Genetics (ESHG) together
developed a Background document and Recommendations to inform and stimulate ongoing societal debates. This document provides the
background to the Recommendations. Germline gene editing is currently not allowed in many countries. This makes clinical applications in
these countries impossible now, even if germline gene editing would become safe and effective. What were the arguments behind this legisla-
tion, and are they still convincing? If a technique could help to avoid serious genetic disorders, in a safe and effective way, would this be a rea-
son to reconsider earlier standpoints? This Background document summarizes the scientiﬁc developments and expectations regarding
germline gene editing, legal regulations at the European level, and ethics for three different settings (basic research, pre-clinical research and
clinical applications). In ethical terms, we argue that the deontological objections (e.g. gene editing goes against nature) do not seem convin-
cing while consequentialist objections (e.g. safety for the children thus conceived and following generations) require research, not all of which
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is allowed in the current legal situation in European countries. Development of this Background document and Recommendations reﬂects the
responsibility to help society understand and debate the full range of possible implications of the new technologies, and to contribute to regu-
lations that are adapted to the dynamics of the ﬁeld while taking account of ethical considerations and societal concerns.
Key words: germline gene editing / human germline gene editing / ESHRE / ESHG / ethics / legislation / responsible innovation / profes-
sional policy
1 Introduction
Gene editing has attracted major attention from scientists and the media
in recent years. While scientists in laboratories witness a revolution,
much of the conversation about clustered regularly interspaced short pal-
indromic repeats-Cas9 (CRISPR/Cas9) has revolved around its potential
for treating disease or editing the genes of human embryos (Ledford,
2016). Unlike experiments with zinc-ﬁnger nucleases and transcription
activator-like effector-based nucleases (TALEN), the CRISPR/Cas9 sys-
tem turned out to have unprecedented ease and ﬁnesse. Treatment of
cancer patients using gene editing has started (Cyranoski, 2016; Qasim
et al., 2017). Expectations are that many more potential applications will
follow. Ongoing trials are reported for thalassaemia and sickle-cell dis-
ease, mucopolysaccharidosis I and II, and haemophilia B, among others
(www.clinicaltrials.gov). These trials are preparing treatment possibilities,
for instance by studying treatment at the human cellular level. Somatic
gene editing may prove to be a game changer not only in the treatment
of a whole range of serious hereditary, particularly Mendelian, disorders,
but also in the treatment of cancer and infectious diseases. Gene editing
is a medicinal product for human use, where regulations apply. The
European Medicines Authority (EMA) that oversees access of medicinal
products to the market, including advanced therapy medicinal products,
has identiﬁed scientiﬁc and regulatory guidance on gene editing as an issue
for its future agenda (EMA, 2017). Ethical, legal and societal issues for
somatic gene editing include safety and accessibility, and meaningful stake-
holder engagement, education, and dialogue must be organized (Howard
et al., 2017). However, if somatic gene editing became safe and cheap,
there would be few other ethical or legal objections left.
For editing the genes of human embryos the situation is different. The
prospect of technologies coming available that would allow making
changes in the (human) germline has been heavily debated in recent dec-
ades, and in many countries germline interventions have been prohib-
ited, sometimes even accompanied by criminal sanctions (Isasi et al.,
2016). In previous decades, legislation has been developed not allowing
changes in the human germline, including the Convention for the protec-
tion of human rights and dignity of the human being with regard to the
application of biology and medicine, often referred to as the Oviedo
Convention (Council of Europe, 1997) and the recent Clinical Trials
Regulation (No. 536/2014). What were the arguments behind this legis-
lation, and do these still apply? If a technique can help to avoid serious
genetic disorders, in a safe and effective way, would this be a reason to
reconsider earlier standpoints? Discussion with relevant stakeholders is
needed, including professional health care workers, patients, citizens,
and legal and ethical experts. Globally and also within Europe there is
diversity, as several countries have not ratiﬁed the Oviedo Convention,
which prohibits any (human) germline modiﬁcation. Meanwhile in the
USA a summit was organized in December 2015, that brought together
scientists, ethicists, legal experts and patient groups from around the
world (Reardon, 2015). The recent report published by The National
Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (2017; Reardon,
2017) argues that ‘Scientists should be permitted to modify human
embryos destined for implantation in the womb to eliminate devastating
genetic diseases such as sickle-cell anaemia or cystic ﬁbrosis—once
gene-editing techniques advance sufﬁciently for use in people and proper
restrictions are in place’. Furthermore, altering human embryos in the
laboratory for the sake of basic research should be acceptable. The
report of The National Academies (2017) outlines strict limits under
which scientists could proceed in the future. It recommends restricting
the technique to severe medical conditions for which no other treat-
ment exists.
We thus witness that initiatives have been taken worldwide to
exchange views about responsible innovation using human gene edit-
ing, including germline gene editing (GLGE). Modiﬁcations in the germ-
line genome have been considered a much more sensitive issue than
somatic gene editing. The recent scientiﬁc advances rekindle ethical
and policy questions surrounding the acceptability of germline modiﬁ-
cation (Isasi et al., 2016). While in the past some may have considered
the question of acceptability of germline gene modiﬁcation not urgent
WHATDOES THIS MEAN FOR PATIENTS?
This paper is the background to Recommendations from the European Society of Human Reproduction and Embryology (ESHRE) and the
European Society of Human Genetics (ESHG), which considers the issue of gene editing of sperm, oocytes or embryos.
Editing the genetic make-up of sperm, oocytes or embryos has the potential to help people with hereditary diseases, but there are currently
many legal barriers to this across Europe. There are also many ethical questions as this type of gene editing would lead to hereditary genetic
changes being passed down from one generation to the next. This would have potential beneﬁts for people suffering from inherited conditions,
but more research is needed to ensure it would be safe and effective and there is still much ethical debate about such research itself.
The paper summarizes the different ethical objections, legal barriers, research issues and practical problems which currently prevent this type
of gene editing being used and provides a background brieﬁng for the Recommendations the two Societies have made.
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because it was technically impossible, the current scientiﬁc develop-
ments make the issue more urgent than ever. Also, the international
differences and potential for cross-border movements of patients
make societal debate urgent.
The European Society of Human Genetics (ESHG) and the European
Society of Human Reproduction and Embryology (ESHRE) consider it
to be their professional responsibility to contribute to further discussion
on GLGE. As in earlier collaboration between the ESHG and other pro-
fessional societies, a Background document and Recommendations have
been developed. The current text is the Background document. Its aim is
to inform and stimulate ongoing societal debate and serve as a back-
ground for ESHG/ESHRE Recommendations. Drafts of the Background
document and Recommendations were prepared by a joint writing
group. These were discussed in both committees and in a joint meeting
of the two societies on 20 September 2016. A draft of the Recommenda-
tions was online on the ESHG and the ESHRE website from 17 October
until 2 December 2016 forming the backdrop for its presentation at the
American Society of Human Genetics meeting in Vancouver. This Back-
ground document together with the Recommendations were subse-
quently posted online on the ESHG and the ESHRE websites to solicit
comments from experts and the membership of both the ESHG and
ESHRE from 3 April until 8 May 2017. The authors integrated the sugges-
tions to the Background document where appropriate. The endorsed
Recommendations are available in the ‘European Journal of Human Gen-
etics’ (De Wert et al., 2017a) and in ‘Human Reproduction Open’ (De
Wert et al., 2017b).
2 Scientiﬁc developments and
expectations regarding GLGE
It is ﬁrst of all important to distinguish the target population of cells on
which gene editing can be performed, being somatic cells, pluripotent
stem cells (PSC) or the germ cells. Gene modiﬁcations in somatic cells,
or mostly in PSC, are intended for the patients themselves and would
not usually be transmitted to the progeny. In contrast, gene editing in
the germline, and in some cases in PSC that become differentiated to
germ cells in vitro, would change the individual’s hereditary genetic pro-
ﬁle and would thus be transmitted to future generations (Fig. 1)
(Vassena et al., 2016). Besides the gene editing in nuclear DNA, also
experiments aiming at gene editing in mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA)
can be considered as gene editing in the germline. Like editing nuclear
DNA, transmission of genetically edited mtDNA can be used to elim-
inate mutant mitochondria or alter the mtDNA and be transmitted to
offspring. The use of donor cytoplasm to replace one set of mitochon-
dria with a different set is a distinct method of germline modiﬁcation
that does not involve gene editing technologies. In theory, gene-edited
somatic cells could be used for somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT)
aimed at producing genetically modiﬁed descendants (Zhou et al.,
2015). There is a worldwide moratorium on human reproductive clon-
ing, so the latter use of SCNT technology is not considered ethically
acceptable in humans at present.
As for the stage at which germline modiﬁcations could be intro-
duced, scientists envisage that this would be carried out at the level of
the germ cell or its progenitor cells during gametogenesis in vitro (Fig.
1) (Vassena et al., 2016), or later at the stage of the fertilized oocyte
(zygote) or in the early embryo. State of the art literature for these
possible germline modiﬁcations is discussed below.
2.1 Gene editing in zygotes or pre-
implantation embryos
For germline modiﬁcations in experimental settings the genomic edit-
ing system is mostly injected into the cytoplasm or pronuclei of zygotes
or into pre-implantation embryos, after which genetic screening is
used to select the embryos with a corrected genomic pattern in the
absence of detectable off-target genetic modiﬁcations. Should this turn
out to be safe and effective, then similar applications in the clinic are
conceivable. Subsequently, prenatal testing using either cell-free foetal
DNA from the pregnant woman’s blood or one of the more invasive
methods (chorionic villus sampling or amniocentesis), could in theory
verify whether or not a foetus shows molecular or genomic mosaicism.
Mosaic embryos arise as a result of inefﬁcient cutting of the nucleases
or inaccurate DNA repair before the embryo has reached the stage of
cleavage. The pre-implantation embryo stage is generally not favoured
for genome editing as it would most likely lead to a mosaic individual
and possibly to more unforeseen detrimental effects. Various studies in
different animal models have demonstrated the feasibility of gene editing
in animals at the zygote stage (Han et al., 2014; Yoshimi et al., 2014;
Heo et al., 2015; Kang et al., 2015). The potential of the technology to
prevent the onset of a genetic disorder in mice was demonstrated by
the studies of Wu et al. (2013) and Long et al. (2014), respectively, for
cataract and Duchenne muscular dystrophy. Also in non-human pri-
mates, microinjection of Cas9 or TALENs into zygotes led to the birth
of targeted gene-modiﬁed offspring (Niu et al., 2014; Liu et al., 2014a,
b). In mammalian zygotes, the efﬁciency of the correction of an indel in a
single gene by TALENs or Cas9 ranges from 0.5% to 40.9% per injected
zygote (Araki and Ishii, 2014). Ran et al. (2013) reported that the double
nicking by RNA-guided CRISPR–Cas9 nickase treatment can lead to
80–100% efﬁciency in mouse blastocysts. Regarding gene modiﬁcation
in subsequent neonates, the efﬁciencies of indel and gene addition were
0 to 41.7% by TALENs or Cas9, and 1.7 and 3.0% by Cas9, respectively.
In the targeted gene modiﬁcations, the efﬁciency is 2.0 to 6.0% in mouse
offspring, coinciding with off-target mutations (Araki and Ishii, 2014).
In the human, researchers are restricted by the limited availability of
embryos because of ethical and/or legal constraints. Most supernumer-
ary (‘spare’) human embryos available for research will have progressed
beyond the cleavage stage, giving rise to more mosaicism when gen-
omic editing is attempted. Only in countries where the creation of
embryos for the exclusive purpose of research is allowed could this
technique be applied at earlier stages and with fresh oocytes/embryos.
One alternative source would be oocytes that failed to be fertilized,
which could then be fertilized or artiﬁcially activated and subsequently
used for genomic editing for research purposes. Alternatively, abnor-
mally fertilized zygotes (mostly 1 pronucleus (PN) or 3PN) could be
used, as was the case in two recent Chinese reports (Liang et al., 2015;
Kang et al., 2016). Of the 86 injected 3PN human zygotes, 4 (4.7%)
contained the correct genetic material repaired through non-
homologous end joining (NHEJ) (Liang et al., 2015). The genomic edi-
ted embryos were mosaic, similar to ﬁndings in other model systems
(Shen et al., 2013; Yang et al., 2013; Yen et al., 2014). In addition, a sub-
stantial number of ‘off-target’ mutations were observed, either caused
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by the inefﬁcient CRISPR/Cas9 complex acting in other parts of the
genome and/or the abnormal triploid chromosomal content originating
from the abnormally fertilized 3PN zygotes. Also in another more
recent study (Kang et al., 2016), the efﬁciency of homology directed
repair (HDR) of the CCR5Δ32 allele was low, and the edited embryos
originating from 3PN zygotes were mosaic. It has to be noted that nei-
ther of the studies in the human used the most up-to-date CRISPR/
Cas9 methods (Liang et al., 2015; Kang et al., 2016). Recently, some
alternative methods used in mice signiﬁcantly increased the efﬁciency of
genomic editing technology while, at the same time eliminating mosai-
cism in reconstructed embryos.
Even if ethical/legal barriers for embryo research could be removed
and the supply of zygotes or embryos was fully resolved, signiﬁcant
technical hurdles would remain. These need to be tackled to gain con-
trol of the genotype of both alleles in a viable embryo. For example,
microinjection of the genomic tool machinery into zygotes only (not
embryos) is a technically demanding and labour-intensive procedure,
which can hamper subsequent embryo development. As an alterna-
tive, a simple electroporation-based strategy to deliver Cas9/sgRNA
ribonucleoproteins into mouse zygotes was proposed, with 100% efﬁ-
ciency for in vivo genome editing and no decrease in embryo viability
(Chen et al., 2016). A similar technology was recently used by Hashimoto
Figure 1 Overview of the possible strategies to perform genome editing in the germline in men and women. SC, stem cell; MII, metaphase-II; GV,
germinal vesicle; iPS, induced pluripotent stem cells; CRISPR, clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats. (Republished with permission
from Vassena et al., 2016).
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et al. (2016), who claimed that electroporation of the Cas9 protein/
sgRNA into early pronuclear zygotes generates non-mosaic embryos in
the mouse. The key to success was performing the electroporation into
the fertilized zygotes very early, enabling the genomic editing to occur
before the ﬁrst replication (S-phase) of the mouse genomic DNA.
In a recent breakthrough article that appeared after the round of dis-
cussion in the professional Societies as discussed in the Introduction of
this document, the group of Mitalipov (Ma et al., 2017) described the
correction of a heterozygous mutation present in sperm by highly efﬁ-
cient genomic editing using CRISPR/Cas9-based targeting in human
embryos. Interestingly, the double-strand breaks were predominantly
repaired by the wild-type homologous maternal gene in the oocyte
instead of the synthetic DNA that was supplemented during injection.
The highest efﬁciency, with avoidance of mosaicism in the resulting edi-
ted embryos and the absence of off-targets, was achieved when the
CRISPR/Cas9 tool was injected at the time of fertilization, when inject-
ing the mutated sperm. This was not the case when traditional genomic
editing was performed at the zygote stage, the latter resulting in lower
efﬁciency of correctly edited embryos and the presence of mosaicism.
Next, identifying genome-wide off-target sites is important to avoid
and prevent, or at least reduce, false positive and false negative sites;
concomitantly, accurate methods to measure off-target mutation fre-
quencies have to be developed. Current genome-wide sequencing
platforms often cannot detect off-target sites at frequencies below
0.1%. Nowadays next-generation sequencing (NGS) technologies
have been successfully applied to reveal off-target genetic modiﬁca-
tions after application of, for example, CRISPR/Cas technology.
Through whole genome sequencing (WGS), thousands to millions of
sequencing reactions can be performed in parallel allowing genome-
wide screening more rapidly in a high throughput manner. The data
can be analysed by the CRISPR Genome Analyzer platform (CRISPR-
GA), currently a popular bio-informatics tool that provides informa-
tion on size and location of indels and on the efﬁciency of NHEJ and
HDR events. A recently developed, easy-to-use bio-informatics tool
for batch analysis of NGS-generated genome editing data allows detec-
tion of indel mutations and other precise genome editing events as
well as rapid calculation of the corresponding mutagenesis efﬁciencies
(Boel et al., 2016). This progress in off-target detection will help ensure
that the CRISPR/Cas or similar gene editing technologies work in a
safe and accurate manner.
2.2 Gene editing of male and female germ
cells
An alternative to the zygote/embryo approach is to perform gene
modiﬁcations during early gametogenesis. In this manner, growing
immature oocytes or sperm or even precursor cells (primordial germ
cells) can be gene targeted by using the CRISPR/Cas system, produ-
cing genetically corrected mature sperm or oocytes that subsequently
can be used for ART. In the male germ cell line, spermatogonial stem
cells (SSC) can be harvested more and more efﬁciently, and in vitro
culture systems are being developed, also in the human, and optimized
for efﬁcient production of sperm in vitro. So far, animal models have
indicated that SSC can be propagated as clones in culture and then
transplanted back into the testis to generate mature and functional
sperm (Goosens et al., 2013). So a potential strategy would be to
select SSC clones that have undergone correct genomic editing and
are free from off-target mutations. These can then be transplanted to
undergo ﬁnal maturation in vivo. Alternatively, the gene-edited SSC can
be directly differentiated in vitro to mature gene-corrected sperm, to
be used for IVF. Still, optimization of in vitro culture systems is war-
ranted, especially in the human, so that gene editing technologies can
be employed safely and with high efﬁciency.
In the female germline, the oocyte is more easily accessible for gen-
etic manipulation, but currently technical hurdles remain, such as the
small number of oocytes that are available (Vassena et al., 2016). It has
been suggested that oogonia-like stem cells could be harvested, cul-
tured and expanded followed by culture in vitro to the mature
metaphase-II stage (Woods and Tilly, 2013). However, there is still
controversy over the existence of such oocyte precursor cells in the
female and the efﬁciency at which mature, developmentally competent
oocytes can be derived from them.
A last possibility is to produce gametes in vitro from PSC. These PSC
could either be human embryonic stem cells, made genetically identical
to the prospective parent by somatic cell nuclear transfer, or PSC
obtained through the direct reprogramming of differentiated cells
(induced PSC, iPSC.). One advantage of this approach is that PSC in
culture are easy to manipulate to correct genetic abnormalities. PSC
can be grown easily in bulk amounts, especially in the naive state of
pluripotency (Hanna et al., 2010; Duggal et al., 2015; Van der Jeught
et al., 2015) and sustain single cell passaging, which makes them an
ideal source for gene editing experiments with the CRISPR/Cas sys-
tem. Ultimately, these PSC have to be differentiated towards oocytes
or sperm that would contain the genetically corrected information and
can thus be used in ART. PSC-derived gametes were successfully
established in mice (Hayashi et al., 2011, 2012), although this approach
still required a maturation step in vivo in order to obtain functional
oocytes or sperm. Nowadays, full differentiation of mouse embryonic
stem cells into mature functional sperm (Zhou et al., 2016) and
oocytes (Hikabe et al., 2016) has been achieved in vitro. If this strategy
proves successful in the human, despite the system’s greater complex-
ity, genomic editing might well be successfully applied to produce
gene-edited gametes and offspring in the future.
2.3 Genome editing in the mtDNA
Another form of DNA modiﬁcation, albeit not in the nuclear DNA,
involves the transfer of donor mitochondria containing mtDNA from
one cell to another (Hyslop et al., 2016), or the use of genomic editing
in the mtDNA to eliminate mutant mitochondria or at least change the
heteroplasmy ratio (the proportion of abnormal copies of mtDNA) in
progeny, e.g. in order to rescue deﬁciencies in oxidative phosphorylation
(Bacman et al., 2013; Jo et al., 2015; Diot et al., 2016). This mtDNA
modiﬁcation (whether achieved by mitochondrial replacement tech-
nique (MRT) or by editing of the original mtDNA) should be considered
as a genome-altering procedure, which can be passed on to future gen-
erations. Note that in MRT the genome is not edited, and different
safety and efﬁcacy considerations apply when compared to gene editing.
In theory, mtDNA modiﬁcation can also cause heteroplasmy, containing
two or more sets of genetically different mtDNA in the resulting
oocytes, as a result of an incomplete elimination of mitochondria with
mutant mtDNA or of undetected off-target effects (genetic or epigen-
etic). More recently, MRT has been proposed to overcome maternal
transmission of serious mtDNA disorders. For nuclear transfer, the
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nucleus of an oocyte from a patient with a known mtDNA mutation is
transferred into a healthy enucleated donor oocyte (spindle transfer) or
zygote (pronucleus transfer) to overcome mtDNA disorders. The safety
and efﬁcacy of this nuclear transfer technology has been mostly studied
in animal models but has also been shown to cause little if any hetero-
plasmy in human tripronuclear embryos (Hyslop et al., 2016). These
nuclear transfer technologies appear to be efﬁcient in terms of embry-
onic development and safe in terms of minimal mtDNA carryover
(Hyslop et al., 2016; Yamada et al., 2016). In April 2016, the ﬁrst child
resulting from maternal spindle transfer was born (Zhang et al., 2017).
The mother was an asymptomatic carrier of a mitochondrial mutation
that caused Leigh syndrome, a fatal neurological disorder. The child,
who has 1% of its mother’s mtDNA, was healthy at 3 months, although
it is not known if any abnormality might appear later on. The use of gene
editing technology appears also to correct mtDNA disorders. In a het-
eroplasmic mouse model containing two genetic backgrounds of
mtDNA, selective prevention of germline transmission of one kind of
mtDNA has been accomplished using either mitochondria-targeted
restriction endonucleases or TALENs (Reddy et al., 2015). CRISPR/
Cas9 has also been successfully employed in mtDNA editing, and
mitoCas9a (a new version of the enzyme Cas9) with speciﬁc localization
to the mitochondria has been developed (Jo et al., 2015).
2.4 Rationale for germ cell genomic editing
The following lines of basic research involving genome editing technol-
ogy in the germline can be considered: addressing fundamental ques-
tions of early human and animal developmental biology; gaining
information to understand and improve the technique and safety of
genome editing itself; and engineering speciﬁc disease-related muta-
tions in embryos used as experimental animal models, to subse-
quently analyse the genome edited offspring or derivative PSCs for
the development of drugs or other treatments for disease. These
research applications are important for gaining more insight into basic
developmental biology regardless of any potential future human
reproductive GLGE. So far, most of our knowledge of early embry-
onic development is based on animal models, especially the mouse.
However, recent studies have shown that the molecular pathways
involved during early embryonic development differ between animal mod-
els and humans. For example, the SOX17 gene was recently demon-
strated, by the use of human embryonic stem cells, to be crucial for the
formation of primordial germ cells in the human, while this is not the case
in the mouse (Irie et al., 2015). Accordingly, in the UK, a license was
approved in 2016 for Dr Niakan (The Francis Crick Institute, 2016) to
study early lineage segregations in humans. This will hopefully allow us to
understand the molecular pathways involved in early embryonic develop-
ment and differentiation, and might, for example, also be beneﬁcial for dis-
entangling complex or poorly understood causes of infertility (such as
implantation failure) and developing novel routes for treatments.
Germline editing technology could potentially also be applied to
other infertility-related treatments. For example, it has been shown
that mutations in the phospholipase C zeta (PLCz) gene, which is
responsible for successful oocyte activation, can lead to failed fertiliza-
tion after ICSI (Kashir et al., 2010). Two point mutations in the exons
of the PLCz gene were identiﬁed, one paternally, and one maternally
inherited (Kashir et al., 2012). These might be corrected by genomic
editing during spermatogenesis of the male patient or following the
strategy of ﬁrst deriving patient speciﬁc stem cells, followed by gene
correction in stem cells and ﬁnally differentiation towards functional
sperm containing the corrected PLCz gene and function. Similarly, var-
iants in the polo-like kinase 4 gene (PLK4) which predispose to embry-
onic aneuploidy (McCoy et al., 2015) might be corrected in the female
germline and thereby increase the chance of obtaining more euploid
embryos for implantation and conception of a genetically normal child.
3 Legal regulations regarding
GLGE (European level)
The focus of this paragraph is on transnational, in particular European,
regulation of embryo research and germline genetic modiﬁcation. The
international regulatory landscape for developing GLGE has been
summarized by Araki and Ishii (2014) and Isasi et al. (2016).
3.1 Embryo research
An important element in this landscape is the variation of national
legislation governing embryo research among European countries. On
the one side of the spectrum, some countries (e.g. Austria, Germany,
Italy) forbid all research using human embryos (only excepting ‘non-
instrumentalizing’ research aimed at beneﬁtting the embryo in ques-
tion). On the other side, a limited number of countries (e.g. the UK,
Belgium and Sweden) allow the creation of human embryos for
research purposes. In between, are countries (e.g. France, Portugal,
the Netherlands) allowing human embryo research using supernumer-
ary (left-over or spare) IVF-embryos, while explicitly forbidding the
creation of human embryos for purposes other than pregnancy.
At the European level, an important document is the Convention on
Human Rights and Biomedicine (Oviedo Convention) of the Council
of Europe (1997) that has been ratiﬁed by 29 states. Article 18, Part 2,
of this Convention forbids the creation of human embryos for research
purposes. As ratiﬁcation requires further national legislation by the
ratifying partners to be in line with the Convention, countries having
ratiﬁed this document are bound to maintain this ban.
To the extent that human embryo research aimed at developing GLGE
requires normal one-cell stage embryos, these embryos will have to be
created speciﬁcally for the purpose. As a consequence, this research can
be carried out in a limited number of European countries, depending on
further regulatory conditions also with regard to accepted purposes.
Should the research move to investigating GLGE in blastomeres, super-
numerary IVF-embryos could be used in countries allowing research with
those embryos, depending again on further conditions. Given the ethical
sensitivity both of creating embryos for research and of asking women to
donate the necessary oocytes, the principle of subsidiarity (as for instance
laid down in the Belgian Embryos Act, Article 4 Part 1) requires that no
human embryos should be created for research that can be performed
equally well with spare embryos (Belgisch Staatsblad, 2003).
3.2 Germline genetic modiﬁcation
The scope for future clinical, reproductive application of GLGE will
depend on legislation conditionally allowing, rather than categorically
forbidding, procedures aimed at modifying the human germline.
Whereas most countries (based on recent surveys) currently prohibit
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germline modiﬁcation, many of the concepts used in relevant legal
documents are ill-deﬁned and ambiguous, including the distinction
between research and clinical applications and basic deﬁnitions (Araki
and Ishii, 2014; Isasi et al., 2016). For instance, whereas the Belgian
Embryos Act does not contain a categorical ban on germline modiﬁca-
tion, it contains a provision (Article 5 Part 4) forbidding ‘research or
treatment with a eugenic purpose, that is: aiming at the selection or
enhancement of non-pathologic genetic traits of the human species’
(Belgisch Staatsblad, 2003).
Here again, the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine
(Oviedo Convention) of the Council of Europe (1997) is a key docu-
ment. Article 13 states that ‘An intervention seeking to modify the
human genome may only be undertaken for preventive, diagnostic or
therapeutic purposes and only if its aim is not to introduce any modiﬁ-
cation in the genome of any descendants’.
There has been much debate about whether MRT aimed at helping
women at risk of transmitting a mitochondrial disorder to have healthy
children should be regarded as a form of germline modiﬁcation
(Health Council of the Netherlands, 2001; Nufﬁeld Council on
Bioethics, 2012; Castro, 2016). MRT refers to procedures in which
the pronuclei, meiotic spindle or polar bodies of the prospective
mother’s oocytes are transferred to an enucleated donor oocyte
(Wolf et al., 2015). While UK legislation prohibits clinical applications
of germline modiﬁcation, this ban does not apply to MRT, given recent
regulations speciﬁcally allowing the reproductive use of this technology
subject to some conditions. As these regulations specify the method
used in MRT (germline transplantation rather than editing), this has no
implications for a potential use of GLGE of mtDNA.
The legal context is different in the Netherlands, where legislation was
also adapted to allow for MRT (Dondorp and Bolhuis, 2002). As this
was achieved by limiting the ban on reproductive germline modiﬁcation
in the 2002 Dutch Embryo Act (Staatsblad, 2002) to the intentional
modiﬁcation of the nuclear DNA (Article 24g), it would seem that not
only MRT but also clinical GLGE of mtDNA is beyond the scope of the
legal prohibition of germline modiﬁcation in the Netherlands. Whether
the legislator would have accepted this implication is an open question
as GLGE was not yet available when the Act was drafted.
These are only a few out of many examples of how legislation in this
ﬁeld tends to lag behind the dynamics of the very technologies that it
means to regulate. Considering the dynamics of the scientiﬁc discover-
ies and medical developments it is relevant to reﬂect on what the argu-
ments were behind such legislation. Do these still apply? If a technique
can help to avoid serious genetic disorders, in a safe and effective way,
would this be a reason to reconsider earlier standpoints? It should be
considered to structure a legal framework that could be more ﬂexible
and promptly reactive to the evolution of the technologies and possi-
bilities, under an appropriate societal oversight.
From an ethical point of view, scientists and clinicians must respect
the legal and regulatory framework in their country. They also have
an important responsibility to help society understand and debate
the full range of possible implications of the new technologies, and to
contribute to regulations that are adapted to the dynamics of the
ﬁeld while taking account of ethical considerations and societal con-
cerns. As the European professional and scientiﬁc organizations most
comprehensively involved in the development of GLGE technology,
ESHRE and the ESHG are well placed and willing to take up this
responsibility.
4 Ethics
While the scenario of future genetic modiﬁcation in the human germ-
line has been a topic of debate for decades, recent developments in
genome editing give a new impetus to ethical and societal discussions.
For an adequate debate and reﬂection, it is important to make a dis-
tinction between (non-reproductive) basic GLGE research, (non-
reproductive) pre-clinical GLGE research, and possible future human
reproductive, clinical, GLGE, taking account of both moral concerns
and objections, and possible scientiﬁc and clinical advantages of GLGE.
Although the distinction between basic and pre-clinical research is
important, there may well be an overlap between these types of
research. For instance, basic research may aim at improving the preci-
sion of the technology, thereby lowering the risk of off-target effects
and enabling future clinical GLGE.
4.1 Basic research
4.1.1 Possible advantages
A general advantage of basic research is that it will generate new scien-
tiﬁc knowledge, which may contribute to improving human health and
welfare. GLGE-linked basic research mostly regards the study of fun-
damental questions regarding human embryology and the methods
applied in gene editing. A good example concerns the plans of
researchers in, for example, the UK to study genetic factors linked
with early embryo development, implantation and problems with both
development and implantation. This may help to improve the success
rate of assisted reproduction.
4.1.2 Objections and concerns
There are different types of ethical objections, both deontological and
consequentialist, to basic research regarding human GLGE, especially
insofar as this involves the research use of human embryos.
4.1.2.1 Deontological objections and concerns. Questioning the
‘instrumentalizing’ use of human embryos in basic GLGE research relates
to a wider legal and ethical debate on embryo research that has been
evolving over more than three decades worldwide. Critics of ‘instrumen-
talizing’ embryo research mostly argue that such research is at odds with
the proclaimed high, even ‘person-like’, status of the embryo.
This view is, however, widely contested (Dyson and Harris, 1990;
Health Council of the Netherlands, 1998; Green, 2001). Although the
moral status of the early embryo is signiﬁcant, there is wide support,
both in secular ethics and in various religions, for the view that at least
the early embryo has a lower moral status than a foetus, and much low-
er than a child and adult. For that reason, legal regulations and ethical
principles and guidelines regarding medical research with human sub-
jects, aimed at protecting research participants from serious harm, do
not apply to early (pre-implantation) embryos in vitro (especially if these
embryos will not be transferred). (The arguments for this view differ and
relate, for example, to the lack of sentience and cognitive functions,
and/or the lack of the so-called ontological individuality; after all, the
early embryo may still split, or different embryos may combine to build
one single embryo.) Against this background, many countries have
accepted a regulatory approach which leaves room for at least some
embryo research on (more or less strict) conditions, including propor-
tionality and subsidiarity (see Section 3.1).
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Parthenotic embryos (‘parthenotes’) and 3PN embryos have been
used as alternatives for ‘normal’ embryos in research, including basic
research on GLGE (see Section 2). These alternatives may be used
and preferred for different reasons, including the wish to mitigate or
even completely avoid the controversy regarding embryo research.
Parthenotes and 3PN embryos are regularly not considered to be
embryos as they lack the potential to develop into a (viable) child (a
condition that is frequently part of the deﬁnition of an embryo). Or
alternatively, they are seen as embryos with a somewhat lower status
in view of this diminished potential (De Wert and Mummery, 2003;
Dondorp and De Wert, 2005). Postponing a stance on the possible
merits of these normative views, it is sufﬁcient for the moment to state
that the research use of parthenotes and 3PN embryos does not pre-
empt the need to make use of normally fertilized oocytes for research,
including GLGE-linked research.
Most controversial is whether it would be ethically justiﬁed to not
only make use of left-over or spare embryos but also to create embryos
speciﬁcally for research purposes, the so-called research embryos.
According to ESHRE, among others, there is no fundamental, decisive,
ethical difference between the two (ESHRE Task Force on Ethics and
Law, 2001). After all, both the moral status and the fate of spare and
research embryos are the same. Still, it is widely—and rightly—accepted
that one should not engage in making embryos speciﬁcally for research if
this research can be conducted by using spare embryos. While spare
embryos may be useful for research, including some types of GLGE-
linked research, research embryos are sometimes necessary. Most
importantly, spare embryos conceived by conventional IVF/ICSI are
simply not useful for safety research regarding new (pre- or peri-concep-
tion) reproductive technologies. Examples include IVM and stem cell-
derived (‘artiﬁcial’) gametes. Likewise, the making of research embryos
is necessary for (some types of) pre-clinical GLGE research, especially if
such research aims at studying the effects of GLGE applied in either
gametes or very early embryos, or when such research requires speciﬁc
genotypes, not available in spare embryos.
Most jurisdictions accept a time-limit regarding embryo research of
14 days. Recent research suggests that it will become possible to grow
human embryos in vitro for longer than 2 weeks. Research beyond 14
days may increase the value and relevance of both basic and pre-
clinical safety research. This may hold true for GLGE-linked research
as well. As a consequence, a (renewed) discussion about the ethics of
a possible extension of the time-limit has started (Pera et al., 2015;
Hyun et al. 2016). Questions include: what, precisely, are the argu-
ments in favour of the present 14-day limit? Are these arguments con-
vincing or could a later time-limit be ethically and legally justiﬁed, and if
so, what limit—and why? What about a slippery slope? Clearly, the
time-limit regarding embryo research should be part of the agenda for
further ethical and societal debate and reﬂection.
Another relevant item for the normative debate on research embryos
is the position and protection of candidate donors of oocytes for
research. Concerns regard both the autonomy and the welfare of oocyte
donors. Among others, ESHRE recommended to impose conditions, in
line with the regular safeguards to protect participants in research, aimed
at minimizing the risk of pressure to donate and avoiding disproportion-
ate medical risks and exploitation (Health Council of the Netherlands,
1998; ESHRE Task Force on Ethics and Law, 2007a). Such conditions
should also be taken into account in the context of non-reproductive
GLGE research with research embryos. The future availability of surplus
oocytes frozen (but no longer needed) for fertility preservation might
eliminate or at least lower some of these risks and concerns.
A ﬁnal deontological concern emerges with the possible use of WGS
(‘comprehensive’ pre-implantation genetic screening (PGS)) of edited
embryos, in the context of a trio-analysis, as a method to pre-clinically
study and reduce possible off-target effects (iatrogenic damage) in edited
embryos. This strategy would require speciﬁc informed consent from
the providers of the spare embryos or gametes used. The central nor-
mative question raised by such screening would be how to respect the
gamete or embryo providers’ right (not) to know/(not) to be informed
about any incidental ﬁndings (IFs) regarding their own genetic status.
This question is not unique to such GLGE-linked research, as it also
arises in the context of, for example, genomic research making use of
human material in biobanks. Relevant guidelines for the responsible
handling and communication of IFs can be found in recent literature and
documents (Health Council of the Netherlands, 2014; Hehir-Kwa et al.,
2015).
4.1.2.2 Consequentialist objection: the ‘slippery slope’ towards
reproductive GLGE. The slippery slope-argument against basic GLGE
research presumes both that allowing such research will result in
future reproductive applications (the empirical premise), and that such
reproductive applications are ethically unjustiﬁed (the ethical premise).
What about the strength of these premises: are these convincing?
Both premises are contested. With regard to the empirical premise,
one may argue that reproductive applications of GLGE will not automatic-
ally follow—these could continue to be forbidden, as is the case now in
most countries worldwide. In scrutinizing the empirical premise of the slip-
pery slope objection, it may be important to make a distinction between
basic and pre-clinical GLGE research (even though the demarcation is not
sharp) as pre-clinical research may be more vulnerable to this slippery
slope objection than basic research. For that reason, this objection will be
elaborated in that context (see Section 4.2).
4.2 Pre-clinical research
Pre-clinical research aims at assessing the effectiveness and safety of
possible future clinical/reproductive GLGE.
4.2.1 Possible advantages
The general value of pre-clinical research has been acknowledged in the
normative framework for responsible innovation in assisted reproduction
and related technologies (ART), as proposed by, amongst others, the
Health Council of the Netherlands (1998) and (the Task Force on Ethics
and Law of) ESHRE (2007b). While new, experimental, reproductive
technologies are often introduced in the clinic without proper pre-clinical
research, including safety studies, this framework stipulates that pre-
clinical research, primarily aimed at avoiding or at least reducing health
risks for possible future children thus conceived, should be performed as
much as is reasonably possible. Such research could involve using cells/
tissues, animals, and human embryos in vitro (on strict conditions) (Health
Council of the Netherlands, 1998; ESHRE Task Force on Ethics and Law,
2007b). The ethical rationale of pre-clinical safety research is obvious:
one should rather experiment on early embryos in vitro than on future
children thus conceived and prospective parents, especially mothers. As
Anne McLaren eloquently stated: to refrain from adequate pre-clinical
safety studies is like ‘making the ﬁrst test of a new aircraft-guidance
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system on a crowded Boeing 747’ (McLaren, 1989). This framework
would be relevant for any proposed future clinical applications of GLGE.
4.2.2 Objections and concern
4.2.2.1 Deontological objection. If human embryos are used in pre-
clinical research, such research, like basic research involving human
embryos, is criticized because of the instrumental use of embryos. As
indicated before, this criticism is based on a widely contested view on the
moral status of the early human embryo (see section 4.1.2).
4.2.2.2 Consequentialist objection: the slippery slope. As stated
before (see section 4.1.2), pre-clinical GLGE research may be more
vulnerable to the slippery slope objection than basic GLGE research;
the step from basic GLGE research to clinical application of GLGE is
much greater than the step from pre-clinical GLGE research to clinical
GLGE. After all, the whole idea of pre-clinical research is to study
whether the conditions for sound clinical applications in terms of effect-
iveness and safety can be met. But crucially, the slippery slope’s second,
ethical, premise, namely that (any) reproductive GLGE is ethically
unjustiﬁed, is not self-evident. In fact, there is wide disagreement
regarding the ethics of possible clinical GLGE apart from safety-
concerns. If one would consider, for example, principled, deontological,
objections to clinical GLGE to be convincing (see section 4.3.2), then
pre-clinical studies would not only be a complete waste (of money,
energy and embryos) but also bring us dangerously close to the edge of
the slope. And as long as it is unclear as to whether safe clinical GLGE
could be morally justiﬁed, pre-clinical safety research can be easily dis-
missed as premature (and disproportional). But if only safety issues
stand in the way of morally justiﬁed clinical GLGE, then, obviously, pre-
clinical safety studies would be justiﬁed.
4.3 Future reproductive human GLGE
4.3.1 Possible advantages
GLGE could, if safe and effective, contribute to greater welfare, ﬁrst
and foremost in terms of health gains. Such GLGE could well be more
effective than somatic editing when it comes to multi-organ disease,
and have a further advantage because of its trans- or multi-
generational effects. According to some commentators, GLGE may
also have positive—but contested—effects in terms of enhancement
(see below) (Savulescu et al., 2015).
Linked to this is the argument of respect for reproductive autonomy.
People at high genetic risk of having a child affected with a serious dis-
order or handicap may feel more conﬁdent to reproduce or may see the
editing as a prerequisite of reproduction (Sugarman, 2015). Even though
there are other reproductive options to avoid genetic disorders in future
children, people may have reasons to prefer GLGE (see below).
Last, but not least, correcting disease-causing genes may be seen as
promoting justice: increasing the equality of opportunity of every person.
The natural unequal distribution of capabilities (through the genetic lot-
tery) is corrected by modifying the genetic constitution of persons who
received less than their fair share of capabilities (Buchanan et al., 2000).
4.3.2 Objections and concern
Again, it may be helpful to distinguish different types of objections and
concerns:
4.3.2.1 Deontological objections. The deontological arguments
against germline gene modiﬁcation have been around for some decades.
We will only discuss the more relevant ones and leave aside the general
objections such as ‘it is unnatural’, ‘playing God’, etc. The main problem
with several of the arguments is that they are very broad and would be
applicable to many medical interventions that are (very) widely accepted,
like contraception, fertility treatments and organ transplantation.
An important argument is that germline modiﬁcations threaten
human dignity. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
(1982) stated that human dignity implies ‘the right to inherit a genetic
pattern which has not been artiﬁcially changed’ and also the Council of
Europe (1997) declared germline modiﬁcations to go against human
dignity. However, if GLGE is used to correct defects and to restore
health in future children, it is difﬁcult to see how this would show a
lack of respect for human dignity. A speciﬁc interpretation of the dig-
nity argument is linked to the idea that the human species as such
should be respected. Related to this idea is the presentation of the
human gene pool as a ‘common heritage’ that concerns the whole of
humanity (UNESCO, 2015). There are at least two problems here.
The ﬁrst regards the concept of the ‘human gene pool’ (Juengst,
2006). Mistakenly, the human gene pool seems to be seen as a ﬁxed
catalogue of all human genes. It is unclear why the present catalogue
should receive a special status. Moreover, for the sake of mankind, the
gene pool has to continue to evolve. In addition, the present objection
would mean that every mutation in every new person is problematic.
To avoid this conclusion, one would have to focus on intentional gen-
omic modiﬁcations. However, intentional modiﬁcations need not
entail a change in the human gene pool. Gene editing could for
instance be used to repair or reinsert an already existing gene (i.e. a
normal allele). Supposedly, critics want to prevent the (hypothetical)
introduction of genes that would alter the person to a point where he
or she would have features that no other human being has. This may
be a valid argument against genetic enhancement (although the line
between treatment and enhancement is difﬁcult to draw, see below),
but not against the editing of disease-causing mutations. Apart from
the fact that human dignity is a very broad concept and notoriously dif-
ﬁcult to deﬁne, it looks as if this argument cannot serve to condemn all
germline gene modiﬁcations.
Another objection is that germline intervention would violate the
autonomy of future children. Different variants of this objection may be
discerned. A ﬁrst version holds that GLGE would be at odds with the
autonomy of children thus edited as they did not consent to having their
genome modiﬁed (Collins, 2015) nor to being included as research sub-
jects (in clinical trials). Although correct, this is true for all reproduction
(including natural reproduction) and it is even theoretically impossible to
respect this interpretation of autonomy since there is no person before
or at the moment of the decision. A second variant of this objection is
that GLGE would undermine (what Joel Feinberg has called) the child’s
right to an open future (Feinberg, 1980), in that the child would be pre-
determined and pressed into some sort of a ‘mould’ in order to optimally
meet his parents’ expectations. This would not only ‘instrumentalize’ the
particular child but would simultaneously undermine respect for human
beings more generally (Habermas, 2003). Again, this criticism may be
relevant for at least some (theoretical, even largely unrealistic) types of
enhancement (see below), but seems not to apply to editing disease-
causing mutations.
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A somewhat similar argument is brought forward at the species
level: future generations have a right to an unmodiﬁed gene pool
(Frankel and Chapman, 2000). For some authors, the issue of germline
modiﬁcation is linked to human rights (Annas et al., 2002). Altering
fundamental human characteristics may lead to inequality and unjust
situations in two ways: either the modiﬁed ‘people’ would be superior
to the unmodiﬁed people and would be unduly privileged, or the modi-
ﬁed ‘people’ would no longer be considered as human and conse-
quently may be deprived of their human rights. But again, this
argument seems to be mostly directed at enhancement and is not rele-
vant when it comes to therapeutic or medical editing of disease-
causing mutations.
4.3.2.2 Consequentialist objections. These objections and concerns
regard the risks of reproductive GLGE. It is important to discern med-
ical (health related) and social risks.
4.3.2.2.1 Health/medical risks. The health risks of GLGE concern
not just the particular edited (embryo and) future child, but also next
generations (in plural). The types of risk are rather diverse (see
Section 2) and include off-target effects, (antagonistic) pleiotropy, gen-
etic and epigenetic risks. While recent literature seems to be quite
reassuring in that new variants of CRISPR are depicted as having
increasingly less off-target effects, at the same time some experts wor-
ry that ‘CRISPR enthusiasts have their head in the sand’ about the
safety of editing (Begley, 2016).
There is a strong consensus worldwide that, in view of the many
unknowns, including the uncertainty about the reversibility of possible
adverse health effects, any clinical GLGE would be at least premature.
The question is whether it could ever be sound to apply GLGE clinic-
ally and if so on what conditions. In order to reduce health risk for chil-
dren thus conceived, a combination of measures and safeguards could
be considered, including:
− performing adequate pre-clinical research,
− embedding possible future reproductive GLGE in a research
trajectory,
− limiting clinical GLGE to causative genes in order to minimize the risk
of pleiotropy,
− adding back-up WGS/whole exome sequencing (WES)-based PGS
(and/or similar prenatal screening), and
− embedding clinical GLGE in long-term follow-up studies, which may
be especially important for risk reduction for next generations.
Pre-clinical research—There is a strong consensus that clinical GLGE
could only be justiﬁed after adequate pre-clinical studies and that more
pre-clinical GLGE research is needed (Hinxton group, 2015; The
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2017).
This approach (‘patience, not patients’) is in line with the general frame-
work for responsible innovation in assisted reproduction as developed
by, among others, ESHRE (ESHRE Task Force on Ethics and Law,
2007b) (see Section 4.2). Clearly, questions about risk are not just sci-
entiﬁc, but also normative. The vexing question remains of when ﬁnd-
ings of adequate pre-clinical safety studies would be sufﬁciently
reassuring to justify experimental reproductive technologies in general
and clinical GLGE in particular—how safe is safe enough? What is the
proper evaluation standard for any such risks? Even after extensive,
reassuring pre-clinical safety research there will always be a residual risk
that can only be clariﬁed by engaging in clinical research. A ‘zero risk-
tolerance’ criterion would preclude any clinical innovation (because of
its inherent risk) and would be at odds with regular assisted reproduc-
tion practice. But what is, then, the appropriate alternative evaluation
standard? Obviously, it is important to avoid arbitrary and ad hoc deci-
sions, and to develop a coherent and transparent policy.
A clinical research trajectory—Whether we would consider the step
towards clinical application of GLGE should depend on the outcomes of
basic and pre-clinical research, taking account of further ethical and legal
discussion, societal views, risks and implications (see below). If so, this
should be embedded in a formal and rigid research trajectory.
According to the Clinical Trials Regulation (2014) EU No.536/2014,
Article 90 ‘No gene therapy clinical trials may be carried out which result
in modiﬁcations to the subject’s germ line genetic identity’. The implica-
tion of this regulation may well be that clinical GLGE research will be
impossible in the European Union (EU) so that such research takes place
outside the EU and without proper research protocols and oversight.
Focus on causative mutations in order to reduce pleiotropic risks—While
the debate about the health risks of future clinical GLGE seems to concen-
trate on off-target effects, the risk of pleiotropy is as important, including
antagonistic pleiotropy, meaning that decreasing the risk of developing a
particular disease may simultaneously increase the risk of having another
disease. Current knowledge of the human genome is rather fragmentary—
which is a reason for concern regarding clinical GLGE:
‘Pleiotropy may be a widespread phenomenon … if antagonistic
pleiotropic effects are pervasive then this suggests that we use caution
when we design genetically-based treatments for diseases. … a full
understanding of the risks and beneﬁts of undergoing such gene-
targeted treatment is essential to ethical patient care. … Rather than
just focusing on a culprit disease allele and silencing it, selectively inhi-
biting the allele’s deleterious pathway while allowing the beneﬁcial
pathway to persist becomes a more responsible, albeit more difﬁcult,
course of action’ (Carter and Nguyen, 2011).
This risk seems to be of lesser concern when clinical GLGE would
involve well-known highly penetrant (causative), clearly pathogenic,
mutations linked with Mendelian diseases—but may be more relevant
when clinical GLGE would involve alleles linked with complex disorders
and traits, caused by less well or not understood gene-environment or
gene-gene interactions. In view of this, GLGE of clearly pathogenic muta-
tions can more easily be justiﬁed as being proportional than GLGE of
less well understood mutations and genetic variants.
Back-up testing—One might consider including WGS/WES-based
‘comprehensive’ PGS, combined with a trio-analysis, as a safeguard to
detect off-target effects (iatrogenic damage) in edited embryos. Clearly,
such PGS may simultaneously generate IFs, including both inherited and
de novo mutations. The ethics of comprehensive PGS is more complex
in a clinical context as compared with using such a safety-test as part of
pre-clinical studies (see above). Ethical issues of the former include the
feasibility of prospective parents’ informed consent, the proper handling
of difﬁcult reproductive genetic counselling dilemmas, including possible
tensions between transfer criteria and preferences of applicants on the
one hand and professionals on the other, and the possible invasion of
future children’s right to an open future, more in particular their right
not to know about their genetic status, i.e. their right to decides them-
selves, later in life, when competent, about undergoing predictive gen-
etic testing for late(r) onset diseases (De Wert, 2009; Hens et al.,
2012). In theory, at least some of these issues could be avoided or miti-
gated by an additional round of GLGE of any IF or off-target effect found
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—but this scenario seems to be far-fetched. A more realistic scenario
(depending on the results of pre-clinical research into possible off-target
effects of GLGE) may be to target clinical PGS to possible off-target
effects and to then select an unaffected embryo for transfer. Maybe,
similar WGS/WES-based screening could alternatively be considered
during pregnancy.
Follow-up—Part of the framework for responsible innovation in
assisted reproduction is the follow-up of children conceived through
new, experimental reproductive technologies (Health Council of the
Netherlands, 1998; ESHRE Task Force on Ethics and Law, 2007b). A
fortiori, any future clinical GLGE should be embedded in such follow-
up studies. Experience so far with follow-up studies linked with ARTs
shows that there are practical barriers and limits in terms of, for
example, lack of funding and tensions with parental autonomy and
familial and children’s privacy, especially when it comes to long-term
follow-up, as would be the ideal in this context.
Many critics of GLGE argue that there are safer alternatives, especially
PGD or more precisely: PGD combined with a selective transfer of a
‘healthy’ embryo. In view of these alternatives, it is sometimes questioned
as to whether there is a real need for human GLGE (see below).
4.3.2.2.2 Societal risks and concerns. There are different types of
societal risks and concerns. We will focus here on four of these, two
of which are often addressed under the heading of ‘eugenics’. As
eugenics is a term with very different meanings, we will avoid this term
as much as possible and point to speciﬁc societal concerns covered by
this term (Paul, 2014).
Disability rights—A ﬁrst concern is that GLGE may have negative con-
sequences for (at least some) people with handicaps and disorders. This
concern, which does not regard GLGE speciﬁcally, but reproductive and
genetic medicine more generally, is often called ‘the disability rights cri-
tique’. In the background of this critique is the tension between the
medical and the social model of disability (Parens and Asch, 2000;
Shakespeare, 2014). While the medical model, aimed at prevention and
treatment of disease, is based on an individualistic account of disability
that focuses on the biological deﬁcit, the social model stresses societal
and cultural co-determinants of disability, like exclusion of people with
impairments, environmental barriers to participation, stigmatizing cul-
tural discourse, and discrimination. In recent years, patient organizations
(sometimes explicitly under the umbrella of the disability rights move-
ment) have substantially contributed to a public policy agenda aimed at
strengthening the societal position, interests and rights of people with
disabilities through barrier removal, anti-discrimination legislation and
inclusion of people with disabilities. At the same time, patient organiza-
tions are very much in favour of research on new therapies.
The disability rights concern comes in different forms (Buchanan
et al., 2000). One is the so-called expressivist argument, holding that
genetic interventions, including GLGE, express negative judgments
about the worth of the life of people with disabilities, which would vio-
late their right to be regarded as persons of equal standing. Obviously,
society should (continue to) protect the equal rights of people with
impairments. However, it is difﬁcult to see how this would amount to
an argument against developing new (genetic or non-genetic) therapies
which may substantially improve their quality of life and avoid serious
suffering. A second concern is that both preventive and therapeutic
medical interventions, including GLGE, could reinforce the traditional
medical model, with its blindness for sociocultural determinants of
disability. While a one-dimensional medical approach is, indeed, to be
avoided, this is not an argument against developing new treatment
options either. A ﬁnal concern is articulated as the ‘loss-of-support’
argument, i.e. that to the extent that genetic science, prevention and
therapy will lead to reducing the number of disabled people, public
and political support for these people will also dwindle. While this con-
cern underlines the continued responsibility of society for also sup-
porting lower numbers of people with particular handicaps, this is
again not a good reason to refrain from developing new types of pre-
vention or therapy, such as germline or somatic gene editing. If we
would accept the loss-of-support argument, we should also stop cur-
rent preventative programmes, such as recommending folic acid to
pregnant women in order to reduce the risk of neural tube defects
which would be unacceptable.
Some commentators, taking the social model to its extreme, argue
that there is no real need to invest in the development of new treat-
ments, genetic or otherwise. In their view it is society that needs to be
treated, rather than people with impairments. While it is certainly true
that at least part of the problems that many people with impairments
encounter could be diminished or even avoided if society were more
inclusive of diversity, the problems of people with impairments cannot
simply be reduced to prejudice and exclusion. The extreme variant of
the social model disregards limitations that cannot be erased in even
the most ‘barrier-free utopia’ (Davis, 2010; Shakespeare, 2014).
All in all, the disability rights critique forcefully reminds society of its
responsibilities towards people with disabilities, more particularly its
obligation to remove barriers for inclusion, but it should not be used
as an argument against the development of medical therapies, including
GE, irrespective of whether it is somatic or germline GE.
The undermining of reproductive autonomy—Concerns have been
raised that reproductive GLGE will increase the pressure to avoid the
conception of affected/handicapped babies and as a result undermine
prospective parents’ reproductive freedom. This may happen in differ-
ent ways: by more or less subtle moral and social pressure or even by
legal enforcement (direct coercion). How likely is this scenario, how is
to be evaluated and what are the implications for policymaking regard-
ing clinical GLGE?
For evaluating this objection, it is important to place GLGE in the
broader context of repro-gene-ethics and options to avoid the birth of
(seriously) affected/handicapped children. Although views about pro-
spective parents’ responsibility regarding the handling of possible
reproductive genetic risk vary widely, there is a strong consensus in
ethics that taking reproductive genetic risks is not ethically indifferent
and that prospective parents should, in principle, try to avoid at least
high risks of serious suffering for future children. This is widely con-
sidered to be a moral—not a legal—responsibility. Direct coercion
(legal enforcement) to make use of ‘preventive’ options, such as pre-
natal testing and selective abortion or PGD, maybe linked with GLGE,
would be ethically and legally unjustiﬁed—and seems to be rather
unlikely, at least in democratic countries respecting human rights. Still,
socio-moral pressure to avoid high genetic risks of having a seriously
affected child may increase as the possibilities for such avoidance
grow. In fact, this is a worry already regularly mentioned and encoun-
tered in the context of current repro-genetic options, like making use
of donor gametes, prenatal testing and PGD, although there may also
be pressure, at least in some cultures and families, to not make use of
these options. Importantly, however, this risk is not widely considered
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to be a convincing objection to the offering of such options. On the
contrary, these options are considered valuable ﬁrst and foremost as
they may allow prospective parents to take measures to avoid the
conception or birth of seriously affected children in their families. In
view of this, and taking account of the fact that GLGE would add only
a little to any already existing, more or less subtle, social pressure, it
would be problematic and inconsistent to prohibit GLGE in order to
protect reproductive autonomy. Instead of selectively and arbitrarily
prohibiting a particular technology in order to protect future repro-
ductive freedom, society should uphold and materialize its willingness
and commitment to provide adequate medical care and societal sup-
port for each and every handicapped baby. Any punishment of parents
who conceive a handicapped baby, whose conception and/or birth
could have been prevented, by withholding (funding for) adequate
medical care of such babies would not only undermine the reproduct-
ive conﬁdence and autonomy of prospective parents, it would also be
highly unjust to these babies (De Wert and De Wachter, 1990;
Dondorp et al. 2015) and unacceptable at a societal level.
In the context of applying for assisted reproduction, the situation may
be somewhat more complex. According to the widely accepted norma-
tive framework for genetic counselling and testing in reproduction, the
central ethical principle is respect for reproductive autonomy. This is
made operational by underscoring the importance of both the pre-
requisite of voluntariness (as part of informed consent) and the ideal of
non-directive counselling, which implies that doctors should support
prospective parents at high risk of having an affected child, whatever
reproductive option they select, preferably after an exploration of what
options are available and what their ‘considered feelings and views’ are
in relation to these. This accepted ethical guidance for reproductive gen-
etic counselling is, however, not entirely applicable in the context of
assisted reproduction. After all, doctors involved have the professional
responsibility to take account of the welfare of the possible future child
and to refrain from medically assisted reproduction in case of ‘a high risk
of serious suffering/harm’ to the child (ESHRE Task Force on Ethics and
Law, 2007b). In view of this, it may be morally justiﬁed to offer PGD to
applicants at high genetic risk of having a seriously affected child as a con-
dition for access to assisted reproduction—a so-called coercive offer
(ESHRE, 2011). If so, a case could perhaps be made for offering GLGE
(instead of PGD aimed at a selective transfer of a ‘healthy’ embryo) to
prospective parents at high genetic risk as a condition for access to
assisted reproduction. There may well be different views about whether
this would indeed be acceptable—but, even if clearly problematic, this
scenario is not a good reason to refrain from offering GLGE (if proven
to be safe and effective) at all.
‘Enhancement’: designer babies—An important concern is the fear
that prospective parents (and clinicians/companies) may engage in
making the so-called designer babies. Like ‘eugenics’, the terms ‘germ-
line enhancement’ and ‘designer baby’ are often not precisely deﬁned.
Mostly, the terms seem to refer to modifying/editing the genome of
future children for non-medical reasons, or, maybe more precisely, for
the improvement of normal traits. Examples often mentioned include
raising cognitive skills/IQ, a social attitude/empathy, and exceptional
musical and sporting capacities. But strengthening the resistance to dis-
eases or eliminating carrier status for recessive conditions (in situations
where being a carrier has no clinical signiﬁcance for the health of the
carrier himself) can also be regarded as forms of enhancement, which
illustrates the conceptual blurring of medical and non-medical,
preventative and enhancement-like applications (Health Council of the
Netherlands, 1989; Buchanan et al., 2000; Comfort, 2012).
People have different expectations regarding the feasibility of germ-
line enhancement. While ‘designer baby’ talk plays a major role both
in the imagination of the public and in scenarios discussed by policy-
makers and philosophers/ethicists (partly as a consequence of the
genetic reductionism communicated by many high-proﬁle geneticists in
the past), most biomedical experts seem to consider this as science
ﬁction, at least insofar as making a ‘designer baby’ would require the
modiﬁcation of complex traits. Some recent publications clearly state
that even with the most accurate and reliable version of CRISPR, pro-
gramming favourable traits in human embryos may not be possible
(Janssens, 2015, 2016). Technology is not the limiting factor in the
enhancement of individuals, but rather, so it is argued, it is nature. A
trait can be edited in the germline only when two conditions are met.
First, the trait must be predominantly determined by DNA—its herit-
ability must be close to 100%. According to a recent review, most
potentially desirable traits have a moderate heritability; for example,
the heritability of intelligence and higher-level cognitive functioning is
around 50% (Polderman et al., 2015). Second, for enhancement to be
practical, the traits in question must be caused by a single variant or an
interaction among a limited number of variants. Although it may
become possible to edit DNA accurately at multiple loci, it is unlikely,
so the argument continues, that we will learn anytime soon how to
successfully edit tens or hundreds of variants simultaneously. GLGE for
enhancement purposes should, then, be considered a non-issue: ‘(….)
progress should not be hindered by an ethical debate about a potential
misuse of the technology that will not be possible’ (Janssens, 2015).
Others disagree, however, for different reasons. First, there may
well be some not a priori unrealistic examples of enhancement of less
complex traits, such as resistance to particular infections. Second,
while successfully editing tens or hundreds of variants simultaneously is
not a realistic option at the moment, this may well change. And third:
some prospective parents may want to make use of CRISPR—if safe
and affordable—for more complex normal traits even if a successful
programming of the desired trait cannot be guaranteed—a signiﬁcant
increase of the likelihood of the phenotype may be ‘good enough’ for
them to proceed. It is not unrealistic, then, to expect that commercial
companies and professional GLGE ‘enthusiasts’ may want to exploit
prospective parents’ dreams (or their fears to lag behind) by selling
them this technology as a means to at least improve their chances of
having a ‘perfect child’ (however that is understood). Even if the
designing is still imperfect, this may be a highly lucrative market (think
of the analogy with companies which offer direct-to-consumer tests).
Competition for a market share may lead these companies to exagger-
ate both the heritability of the relevant traits and the probability of the
effectiveness of GLGE. They might also see an attractive market in
advertising ‘smart combinations’ of GLGE and life-style modiﬁcation,
thus bypassing any accusations of outdated genetic reductionism.
Ethical evaluations of GLGE enhancement differ, not just because of
different normative views, but also because the concepts and exam-
ples used differ signiﬁcantly. In the early days of the debate on GLGE
there was an almost unanimous support for the view that we can and
should make a sharp distinction, both conceptually and ethically,
between gene therapy and enhancement, of which only the former
could be morally sound (Anderson, 1989). But this strong consensus
seems to have disappeared, maybe surprisingly quickly (Harris, 2010;
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Comfort, 2012). The so-called liberal eugenics, arguing that prospect-
ive parents should be largely free to genetically design their future chil-
dren, has gained considerable support, at least in the academic
literature, which is not to say that anything goes. Most commentators
who consider the idea of drawing a rigid line between (germline gene)
therapy and enhancement to be problematic, both conceptually and eth-
ically, seem to argue in favour of different ethical evaluations of speciﬁc
types of genetic enhancement. Anticipating a better scientiﬁc understand-
ing of the complexity of our genome and further technical developments
and breakthroughs in the ﬁeld of GLGE, it might be helpful to make a dis-
tinction between non-medical and medical genetic enhancement, and,
with regard to the former, between ‘instrumentalizing’ and ‘non-instru-
mentalizing’ types of genetic enhancement. A more detailed reﬂection is
beyond the scope of this paper (and, in view of the current state of sci-
ence, highly hypothetical), so we only add a few remarks:
− Medical genetic enhancement: An often used example is the strength-
ening of the human immune system. This, so it is argued, may not be a
priori unsound, as it is linked with the classical aim(s) of medicine and
may in fact be comparable with traditional vaccination. A second
example would be the editing of embryos carrying recessive conditions.
While some authors seem to simply assume that this would be ethically
sound (Wivel and Walters, 1993), others would probably dismiss this
as a problematic form of population eugenics.
− Non-medical genetic enhancement: This is widely considered to be
ethically unsound. Major objections are that this would be at odds
with human dignity, would instrumentalize the child and undermine
its right to an open future (Habermas, 2003; Sandel, 2007; Davis,
2010). But some scholars argue that non-medical germline GLGE
would not necessarily instrumentalize the future child and should
not be categorically dismissed. Some traits are, so it is argued, ‘gen-
eral purpose’ means i.e. capacities that are useful and valuable in
carrying out nearly any plan of life or set of aims that humans typic-
ally have (Buchanan et al., 2000; Glover, 2006). A good example is
intelligence; a genetically (or otherwise) enhanced IQ would not lim-
it the child’s right to an open future.
Even if the reasoning behind the latter view is sound, there are additional
issues to be addressed—apart from the fact that precisely the example of
genetically enhancing IQ is, because of the complexity of this trait, quali-
ﬁed by most genetic experts as totally unrealistic. One further issue is the
need to take account of the possible implications of the phenomenon of
pleiotropy, especially antagonistic pleiotropy. This is a more relevant issue
in the context of possible GLGE of complex traits than when it is about
GLGE of causative genes with a clear pathogenic effect (see above).
Taking pleiotropic risks can be more easily considered to be proportional
when it is linked with avoiding a serious disease than when it is merely
about enhancing a normal, healthy future child.
No doubt, these conceptual and normative issues require a more
detailed analysis and debate. For the moment, it is important to
acknowledge that any enhancement-oriented GLGE of complex traits
is far beyond what may become possible in the next few years or even
decades—and may never become a realistic option. That said, at least
two policy questions are on the agenda right now. First, how do we
tackle the risk of commercial exploitation of uninformed, naïve, paren-
tal dreams about perfect children? Second, is it acceptable or wise to
take the slippery slope-risk that allowing GLGE, even if only for serious
disorders, will in the end (irrespective of well-intended mechanisms to
avoid this, like strict criteria/indications and procedures for societal
oversight of GLGE-practice) result in all sorts of germline enhance-
ments? This question, like the question mentioned previously regarding
the ethical evaluation of residual health risks of possible future clinical
GLGE, should be addressed taking account of another question: what
is the added value of GLGE, in view of the currently available thera-
peutic and reproductive alternatives (see below)?
Inequity—GLGE will in most scenarios be a very expensive proced-
ure. Even if the gene editing in itself may not necessarily be expensive,
the accompanying steps (IVF, PGD, safety measures, etc.) most likely
will be. This raises the question of who will have access to the technol-
ogy. This question is raised for every emerging technique and should be
considered within the context of the distribution of scarce resources.
The inclusion or exclusion of an ART procedure in a decent package of
reimbursed health care will depend on the wealth of the state and on
the status attributed to infertility. At the moment, some countries have
generous provisions for medically assisted reproduction while others
largely leave this to the private market. However, all countries have lim-
its for the spending of public resources on infertility treatment (e.g. female
age, number of cycles). These limits are justiﬁed by different criteria: efﬁ-
ciency, cost-effectiveness and safety. The same criteria could be used for
the decision regarding the reimbursement of GLGE. Three general
remarks may be sufﬁcient for the moment. First, decisions on reimburse-
ment and access could be made in steps. One could for instance at the
start only provide reimbursement for certain types of diseases. Second,
most afﬂuent societies strive to give equal access to medical care for
everyone. That does not mean that when equity is not reached, no one
should have access to the treatment. This ‘levelling down’ justice would in
fact block all progress in medicine. Third, affordability may also to a large
extent depend on patenting and commercialization of the technique
(Newson andWrigley, 2016).
Beside the matter of access based on ﬁnancial means, there is a
second justice consideration that refers to prioritization of diseases.
Here too, several criteria can be used: magnitude and frequency of
need, cost-effectiveness, the existence of alternative interventions,
etc. (Hinxton Group, 2015). The experience with the introduction of
other techniques, such as PGD, may help to design a strategy here.
Likewise, GLGE ‘enhancements’ to subsets of the population could
exacerbate social inequities—although this threat may be somewhat
exaggerated in view of the serious scientiﬁc doubts about the feasibility
of most, rather theoretical, GLGE-enhancements.
4.3.3 Alternatives for reproductive GLGE: ‘no real need’ for the latter?
In view of both the medical and societal objections and concerns, alter-
native options should be taken into account for parents ‘at high risk’ of
having an affected child and who do not wish to have children affected
by the speciﬁc condition they are at risk for. The alternatives may be
of two different types: ﬁrst, therapeutic (postnatal)/non-reproductive,
and second, reproductive. The most obvious therapeutic alternative
may be somatic GLGE. Reproductive alternatives include adoption,
prenatal diagnosis, the use of donor gametes and (IVF/ICSI) PGD
aimed at transferring a ‘healthy’ embryo. The availability of possible
alternatives seems to strengthen the reluctance and opposition to
future reproductive GLGE (Von den Daele, 1985; Health Council of
the Netherlands, 1989): ‘there is no real need to engage in germline
GE’ (Mertes and Pennings, 2015). But what about the effectivity and
availability of these alternatives? And does the balancing of the pros
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and cons of these alternatives indeed lead to the conclusion that these
are to be ethically preferred?
While expectations regarding the effectiveness and future clinical
utility of somatic GE seem to increase, (safe and effective) GLGE could
have two comparative advantages: it is more efﬁcient because of its
multi-generational preventive/therapeutic potential, and it may be
more effective for the prevention/therapy of multi-organ disorders, at
least in theory. For at least a subset of such genetic disorders, somatic
GLGE is simply not a realistic option. Somatic GE may become an
effective treatment for less complex (single organ) disorders, and pre-
ferred by many, even if GLGE would prove to be safe and effective.
But, obviously, context matters. If, for example, prospective parents at
high genetic risk are sub-fertile and apply for IVF/ICSI anyway, their
fertility treatment might be relatively easy combined with GLGE, if safe
and effective, instead of anticipating repeated somatic GE in consecu-
tive generations.
With regard to reproductive alternatives several issues need further
discussion, including:
− Many prospective parents at high genetic risk do not meet the strin-
gent criteria for adopting a child, as accepted in the relevant jurisdic-
tions. Maybe these criteria could be relaxed—but even then, this
may not be a real, let alone the ideal, solution for at least some pro-
spective parents;
− Most prospective parents prefer to have a genetically related child
—adoption or donor gametes are either not an option at all (the
use of donor gametes is forbidden in many countries) or only
second best. How to morally evaluate this preference? Obviously,
this is a fundamental question that concerns reproductive medicine
generally. Even if one would argue that counselling might help pro-
spective parents to reconsider their preference (‘people can be
very happy without having children’, and/or ‘children need not be
genetically linked in order to build a happy family’), to disregard peo-
ple’s persistent preferences for a genetically linked child would be
difﬁcult to justify in view of the principle of respect for reproductive
autonomy. Still, a further debate about the (relativity of the) value of
‘genetic parenthood’ is important.
There is no doubt that PGD aimed at a selective transfer of an unaffected
embryo can and does help many prospective parents ‘at high genetic risk’
to have a (genetically related) unaffected child. To argue, however, that
therefore GLGE is not really needed, is a non sequitur:
− In some (admittedly rare) cases, prospective parents can only have
affected children, e.g. when both partners are affected by the same
autosomal recessive disorder. PGD is, then, a priori pointless.
− Instead of routinely discarding affected PGD-embryos, a differen-
tiated ranking system may be preferable, which prioritizes
unaffected embryos for transfer while cryopreserving the (good
morphology) affected embryo(s) for a possible thawing, editing (if
safe and effective) and transfer in a next cycle. This policy may well
increase the take-home-baby-rate of IVF/ICSI-PGD cycles and be
more patient-friendly.
− Furthermore, in a signiﬁcant number of cases, all embryos in a given
IVF/ICSI-PGD cycle lack the criteria for transfer, either because
they all prove to be affected (think especially of the so-called com-
bination PGD, performed for two indications), or because the
embryos prove to be unaffected, but not a good match for a dis-
eased sib needing hematopoietic stem cells (in the context of PGD/
HLA-typing, aimed at conceiving a health ‘saviour’ baby). The cou-
ple may then engage in a new cycle or consider transferring an
affected embryo or an HLA-mismatched embryo. If effective and
safe GLGE becomes possible in the future, an additional IVF/ICSI-
PGD cycle would be disproportional in view of its (avoidable) bur-
dens and risks (and costs). And wouldn’t the transfer of an affected
embryo be unsound if one could avoid the birth of an affected child
by GLGE?
− For a comparative moral evaluation of ‘standard’ PGD and (PGD
combined with) GLGE, some deontological aspects may be relevant
as well. First, as ‘standard’ PGD aiming at a selective transfer entails
the de-selection (and destruction) of embryos, while GLGE may
(avoid or) at least reduce embryo loss, the latter strategy may be
the morally better one (if safe and effective and) if one acknowl-
edges that the embryo has a signiﬁcant moral status, which is not
necessarily to be identiﬁed with a strict ‘pro-life’ view. Second, if
prospective parents prefer reasonably safe and effective GLGE
instead of PGD aimed at a selective transfer, to not accept this may
be at odds with respect for reproductive autonomy.
4.3.4 Comprehensive PGS: a driver for systematic GLGE?
Assuming further technological improvements, comprehensive PGS,
making use of high-resolution sequencing technology, could be used
not only as an instrument in basic and pre-clinical GLGE research (see
Section 4.1 and 4.2) and as a safeguard in possible future clinical GLGE
(see section 4.3.2) but also it might be (routinely) used in the context
of future regular IVF. In fact, the latter is sometimes advocated in the
medical literature for selecting ‘the best embryo’ for transfer. Such
PGS—which raises a lot of ethical issues (see section 4.3.2) (De Wert,
2009; Hens et al. 2012)—might then function as a powerful ‘driver’ for
clinical GLGE, if proven to be safe, effective and applicable to Day 3 or
even Day 5 embryos; it might be argued that all embryos, like all
humans, are ‘fellow mutants’ and will prove to be ‘affected’ or ‘at risk’
in different ways, being among others heterozygous for some recessive
conditions, and carrying predispositions for more or less common dis-
orders, polymorphisms, and genetic variants. The challenge may then
become to ﬁnd and edit the embryo with the ‘best’ risk proﬁle, which
would push the application of GLGE far beyond the ‘high risk of ser-
ious disease’ cases where it is regularly considered to be possibly
sound in current ethical literature. Especially private clinics and clinics
in countries with a lack of adequate regulation may want to (commer-
cially) offer routine comprehensive PGS combined with gene editing of
any ‘defect’ found. Obviously, this scenario would be problematic in
view of the pleiotropic risks of GLGE, as these can be more easily con-
sidered to be proportional if linked to avoiding a serious disease than
when it is just about editing lower risk factors or, particularly, enhan-
cing a normal, healthy future child. But at the same time, this scenario
urges society even more strongly (than GLGE of one particular disease
characteristic) to engage in a more principled debate about the ethics
of, and policymaking regarding, the conceptually and morally grey area
between therapeutic, preventive, and enhancing GLGE.
5 Recommendations
Based on this overview of the ethical and legal considerations, the
ESHG and ESHRE consider it to be their professional responsibility to
contribute to further discussion on GLGE. Based on this background
document, Recommendations have been developed and discussed
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within both societies (De Wert et al. 2017a, 2017b). We encourage
other stakeholders to also engage in this debate.
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